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The ageing of populations in most industrialised
countries is accompanied by an increase in the need
for long-term care (LTC). LTC is a mix of social and
health care provided on a daily basis, formally or
informally, at home or in institutions, to people suf-
fering from a loss of mobility and autonomy in their
daily living activities. Although loss of autonomy
may occur at any age, its frequency rises with age. In
2011, the first baby-boom generation will turn 65,
and it is forecasted that on average the size of the
old-age population dependent on assistance will
double in the next 50 years in OECD countries
(OECD 2005). At the same time, the number of
informal caregivers is decreasing.This trend is attrib-
uted to the decomposition of the family unit,the dis-
tancing of children from their parents and the in-
crease in women’s employment rates. Furthermore,
low rates of public long-term care coverage suggest
that the financial consequences of dependency could
be catastrophic, even resulting in ruin, for a number
of elderly people and their families (Assous and
Mahieu 2002).
A solution to this lack of public coverage is to devel-
op the insurance market for long-term care. That is
why, for some decades now, insurance companies
have been offering contracts to cover the financial
consequences of dependency and the use of long-
term care. Market evolution strongly depends on
institutional settings, and the United States and
France are currently the most developed markets.
Yet, the demand for this kind of insurance would
seem relatively small in comparison to the impor-
tance of the risk of dependency and the aversion of
individuals to such a risk. Several theoretical and em-
pirical arguments have been proposed to explain the
decisions made when considering the purchase of
long-term care insurance. Among the common argu-
ments quoted, insurance demand for LTC is thought
to be influenced by information asymmetry phenom-
ena, intergenerational factors, bias in risk perception,
the role of the state as insurer of last resort, the fami-
ly structure,access to informal care and the amount of
the inheritance.
The aim of this text is to provide an overview of re-
cent empirical work (Courbage and Roudaut 2008)
studying the determinants of the demand for insur-
ance covering LTC on the French market using cross-
sectional data from the newly developed SHARE
(Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in
Europe) database.
Based on a two-stage model of the likelihood of re-
ceiving informal care, we estimate the probability of
individuals taking out insurance covering LTC.
We examine whether this probability is significantly
influenced by income, education, the probability of
leaving a bequest,family structure,experience of de-
pendency,risk behaviours,level of informal care and
health status.
Let us first start by presenting the arguments that
explain the decision to purchase insurance for LTC
and introducing the way LTC is financed in France.
The decision to purchase LTC insurance
Several theoretical arguments have been put for-
ward to explain the decision to purchase LTC insur-
ance or not.
A common explanation for the unwillingness to pur-
chase LTC insurance is that individuals are inade-
quately informed about the products available and
that they ignore low-frequency high-severity events
that have not occurred recently (Kunreuther 1978).
Another explanation for the limited development of
LTC insurance markets includes the phenomena of
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moral hazard (over-consumption of care encouraged
by insurance) and of adverse selection (over-repre-
sentation of bad risks in the insured population),and
the fact that the interaction of public insurance pro-
grammes arguably crowds out private insurance.
Since LTC is largely provided informally, mainly
through family members, intergenerational factors
have also been put forward to explain the rationale
for taking out LTC insurance (Pauly 1990). The de-
sire to leave a bequest seems to be a major motive
for LTC insurance.However,elderly individuals with
children may decide to forego the purchase of LTC
insurance due to intrafamily moral hazard. Indeed,
parents who prefer to receive care from their chil-
dren may decline the offer to purchase insurance, as
this may create a disincentive for children to provide
care. Intra-family moral hazard differs from classic
moral hazard in the sense that it is not the policy-
holder behaviour that is modified by the presence of
insurance, but the caregiver’s behaviour. Neverthe-
less, it happens that bequests can be structured so as
to provide an incentive for children to care for their
elderly parents. If long-term care insurance were
purchased, parents could increase the sensitivity of
the bequest to caregiving in order to elicit attention
from children (Zweifel and Strüwe 1996).
While theoretical literature on the subject is rather
abundant,relatively little empirical research has been
done on the factors affecting the decision to purchase
coverage,and it relates almost exclusively to the situ-
ation in the United States. Sloan and Norton (1997)
examine the relationship existing between the de-
mand for LTC insurance and, respectively, the be-
quest motive and expectations of future nursing
home use.Although they find phenomena of adverse
selection, the bequest motive does not seem to influ-
ence the demand for LTC insurance. Mellor (2001)
shows that education, income and wealth positively
impact LTC insurance, whilst availability of informal
care has no statistical significant effect on LTC insur-
ance. Doerpinghaus and Gustavson (2002) show that
nursing home expenditure levels, the relative size of
the elderly population and the nursing home popula-
tion are significant explanatory factors of LTC insur-
ance purchase in some states of the United States.
The intuition is that these variables raise awareness
among the elderly about cost and quality issues in
LTC, which should reinforce the utility of LTC insur-
ance for such individuals.Recently,Brown and Finkel-
stein (2007) have presented evidence of supply-side
market failures in the United States LTC insurance
market, such failures being explained by the charac-
teristics and pricing of the products on offer. Finally,
using French data, Courbage and Roudaut (2008)
have shown that insurance for formal long-term care
is purchased to preserve bequests and to protect fam-
ilies in the event of disability. Risk behaviour, as well
as experience of disability,also plays a significant role
in explaining the demand for insurance covering LTC
in France.This last work will be the main topic of the
text below.
Financing long-term care in France
LTC financing varies from one country to the other,
and the organisation of LTC coverage is in general a
function of the health systems already in place. LTC
is often provided by both health and social services,
which are not necessarily disconnected. It may be
difficult to differentiate the health insurance system
from other systems specific to LTC risk. In the face
of LTC expenditure that represents an increasing
share in health budgets, several countries have
decided to consider the risk of dependency as a new
risk and to separate it from the health risk. These
countries have established LTC insurance as a new
branch of their social insurance system (e.g.,Austria,
Germany, Luxemburg, Japan).According to a recent
report by the European Commission (2008), most
European countries recognise the importance of
finding an appropriate balance between public and
private sources of funding.The logic of mixed fund-
ing based on public-private partnership in the cover-
age of LTC risk seems to be the way chosen by the
largest number of countries.
In France, the public coverage of LTC is derived not
only from a long tradition of intervention concerning
social assistance, but also from the great diversity of
actors and sources of financing.At the national level,
the sickness insurance scheme deals with expenses
concerning health care.In addition,the retirement in-
surance scheme allows the financing of a significant
part of living expenses through means of domestic as-
sistance. At the regional level, general councils man-
age the Personalised Allowance of Autonomy (APA).
The APA is paid to people aged 60 or more who are
no longer autonomous, regardless of their financial
situation and geographical location. However, only
those with a low income are exempted from the co-
payment, which can represent up to 80 percent of the
total cost. This allowance is jointly funded by both
central and regional governments.APA can be seen asa the first step towards recognition of dependency as
a new risk in life, yet public coverage remains low in
comparison to the financial expenses incurred by the
occurrence of dependency.1 In view of the complexity
of LTC financing, the French government intends to
create a fifth branch of the social security dedicated to
the risk of LTC. It is expected that this legal project
will be discussed in parliament during the second half
of 2010.
Also,in addition to public coverage,private insurance
has developed in France.LTC insurance contracts are
individual or collective and guarantee the payment of
a fixed allowance, in the form of monthly cash bene-
fit, possibly proportional to the degree of dependen-
cy.The French market,with an annual growth close to
15 percent (Kessler 2008), is one of the most dynamic
amongst the industrialised markets. Contrary to the
United States,public authorities do not use tax incen-
tives to encourage the development of private LTC
insurance. In France, it seems that national debates
associated with the search for new solutions to cover
the risk of LTC, widely covered in the press, have
increased the general public’s awareness of the exis-
tence of this risk.This has supported the development
of the private insurance (Durand and Taleyson 2003).
It also seems that the success of the French market 
is explained by the choice of the products offered.
Whereas US insurers have launched products with ser-
vice benefits (payment proportio-
nal to LTC expenditure), French
insurers have turned to cash bene-
fit products. Policy-holders would
appear to prefer the freedom of
cash disability benefits, even if that
implies the need to organise the
care themselves,to the simplicity of
the service benefit (Durand and
Taleyson 2003).
The data and variables
The Survey on Health,Ageing and
Retirement in Europe (SHARE)
is a multidisciplinary and cross-
national micro-database contain-
ing information on approximate-
ly 22,000 Europeans over the age
of 50 and their spouses.A descrip-
tion of methodological issues can be found in
Börsch-Supan and Jürges (2005). We use the first
wave of SHARE developed in 2004, and updated in
2007.The sample for France contains 3,193 individu-
als. Missing values for some variables and a restric-
tion to individuals aged 50 and over have left us with
2,530 observations.
SHARE asks various questions on the terms of
health insurance and,in particular,on insurance cov-
ering LTC. The question of special interest to us is:
“Do you have any supplementary or private health
insurance for one of the following types of care?”A
list of different types of care is then proposed. The
answers corresponding to insurance covering long-
term care in a nursing home,nursing care at home in
case of chronic disease or disability, and home help
for assistance with daily activities are chosen to
define LTC insurance.As these forms of care corre-
spond to the common definition of LTC, we consid-
ered that an individual has insurance for LTC if he
has subscribed to at least one of these three types of
care.This is the case for 52.7 percent of individuals in
the sample. Note that these three forms of coverage
do not necessarily correspond to what is usually
labelled LTC insurance but could also be provided
through supplementary health insurance. The issue
of relevance is that there is insurance coverage for
these types of LTC.
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Table 1 
SHARE sample variable means and definitions (n = 2530)
Variable Definition
LTCI =1 if respondent reports having private long-
term care insurance (covering LTC in nursing
home, nursing care at home, home help)
52.7%
Informal care =1 if the household has received help from a




Female =1 if respondent is female 54.8%
Age Age at interview 64.48
Children Number of children 2.29
One daughter =1 if respondent has at least one daughter 68.4%
Married =1 if respondent is married 66.0%
Single =1 if respondent is single 6.7%
Divorced =1 if respondent is divorced 10.9%
Widow =1 if respondent is widowed 16.4%
Low inheritance =1 if the household expects not to leave an in-




=1 if the household expects to leave an inheri-
tance of less than 150 000 to his descendants
46.8%
High inheritance =1 if the household expects to leave an inheri-
tance of at least of 150 000  to his descendants
37.5%
Hospital =1if respondent has been hospitalised recently 14.5%
LTI =1 if respondent suffers from chronic or long-
term conditions 
50.7%
a)During the last 12 months.
  Source: Compilation by the authors.CESifo DICE Report 2/2010 27
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Table 1 summarises the main variables used in our
analysis. We consider family structure, income, be-
quest, risk perception, informal care, age and health
level as the main explanatory variables.
Indeed,married persons may feel the need to protect
their partner from the financial burden of impover-
ishment due to long-term care expenses and could
then demand more insurance.The role of children is
more complex,as explained previously,because they
are subject to intra-family moral hazard. Risk per-
ception or awareness is represented through two
types of variables: providing or having provided in-
formal care to a family member, and having person-
ally experienced hospitalisation or serious illness in
the past. So as to test for the influence of intra-fami-
ly moral hazard, we need to know how the presence
of informal care influences the demand for LTC
insurance. Informal care occurs when the household
receives help for personal care,domestic and admin-
istrative help from a descendant. Since we do not
have any indication of the level of insurance premi-
ums, age could be regarded as a proxy for the price
of insurance. One might expect that age is negative-
ly correlated with the probability of purchasing in-
surance since insurance premiums found on the mar-
ket usually increase importantly with age. We also
control for the level of education of individuals as
well as their health status (chronic diseases, level of
activities, symptoms).
The model
As pointed out earlier, children are the main
providers of informal care and their behaviour can
be influenced by the level of insurance. As under-
lined by Mellor (2001), there might be a phenome-
non of endogeneity of informal care in the sense that
the supply of informal care might depend on LTC
insurance coverage. Indeed, people receiving infor-
mal care from a child can be precisely those who lack
insurance coverage. Moreover, in the presence of
intra-family moral hazard, having LTC insurance
would encourage children to reduce or substitute
their help, current or future, by formal care covered
by insurance.To address these concerns,we compute
predictions of informal care reception from the esti-
mation of a probability model of receiving informal
care from descendants to dependent people. Hence,
a probit model is estimated on the sub-sample of
dependant people with only time-invariant variables
in order to provide time- independent predictions.
These variables are gender, level of education, char-
acteristics of the children, income and amount of
expected inheritance. (Table 2, column 1).
In a second step, the estimated probability of receiv-
ing informal care is introduced into the equation of
the demand for insurance (Table 2, column 2). This
equation is estimated on the sub-sample of those
who are not in a position to need help today.
Results
The results show that income has a non-linear, bell-
shape effect on the insurance demand for LTC.Very
low-income people take out little insurance cover-
age, which might be explained by the existence of
higher public coverage for the lowest incomes. It is
mostly middle-income people who take out insur-
ance for LTC. Then, from a certain level of income,
the demand for insurance decreases.
The demand for insurance covering LTC is also
strongly related to the amount of the bequest. In-
deed, an individual who with a high inheritance to
leave to his children is more likely to purchase insur-




















Low inheritance 0.199** –0.369***
Average inheritance 0.276** -0.230***





Robust standard errors using White correction. Ad-
justed for clustering at the household level
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** signifi-
cant at 1%
Variables sex, income, education, health conditions,
risky behaviour are included but not reported, for the
sake of simplicity.
  Source: Estimation by the authors.ance for LTC. This suggests that insurance is pur-
chased in order to preserve the inheritance, thus de-
monstrating some form of altruistic behaviour.
Such altruistic behaviour seems to be confirmed by the
fact that the probability of having insurance for LTC 
is higher for married individuals and those with chil-
dren.Insurance is thus not purchased to protect oneself
from the financial consequences of dependency, but
rather to protect family and relatives against the finan-
cial risks of becoming dependent in the future.
Moreover, we find that the probability of purchasing
insurance for LTC increases for those who have a
higher probability of receiving informal care should
the need arise in the future. An explanation is that
insurance for LTC is purchased to reduce the burden
on potential informal caregivers.Indeed,several stud-
ies suggest that providing informal care may have a
negative effect on the informal caregiver’s health
(e.g.,Schulz and Beach 1999).Formal care covered by
insurance would replace informal care and would
avoid strain on the informal caregiver’s health.
Having been recently hospitalised or having suffered
a serious illness also seems to positively influence
the probability of purchasing LTC insurance. These
findings conform with the results of work carried out
on the role of information and on the perception of
risks in decision-making processes. Indeed, shocks
affecting health or experience of serious illnesses is
often recognised as a source of information that can
lead people to modify their behaviour and their eco-
nomic decisions (Sloan, Smith and Taylor 2003).
Conclusion
While many theoretical arguments have been pro-
posed to explain the decision to purchase long-term
care insurance, little work has been done to study
these phenomena empirically and it almost exclu-
sively relates to the United States. This article pro-
vides an overview of recent work (Courbage and
Roudaut 2008) using cross-sectional data from the
newly developed SHARE database to estimate the
determinants of the probability of purchasing insur-
ance covering long-term care in France.
The main results are consistent with the view that
providing public coverage for low-income individuals
crowds out private insurance. Furthermore, it seems
that the demand for insurance covering LTC is dri-
ven, above all, by altruistic behaviour. It is not neces-
sarily sought out to protect oneself from the financial
consequences of the risk of dependency,but rather to
protect one’s family against the risk of becoming
dependent in the future. Insurance is perceived as a
way to reduce the burden on potential informal care-
givers. Such results lead us to think that the French
insurance market for LTC is not limited by potential
phenomena of intra-family moral hazard, which
could be another explanation for its dynamism.
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